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I.

INTRODUCTION

On May 16, 2011, the United States Supreme Court, in an 8-0 opinion
authored by Justice Breyer,1 addressed an issue that the Court refused to consider
some seven years earlier.2 The decision rendered on May 16 in CIGNA Corp. v.
Amara involved, at least preliminarily, consideration of whether a Summary Plan
Description or other employer-generated documents or communications may under
certain circumstances override conflicting terms in a Plan Document governed by
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”).3 The decision also
addressed the correct legal standard applicable to a plan participant’s claims of an
employer’s ERISA violations and what equitable remedies might be available to
successful plaintiffs under ERISA Section 502(a)(3).4
In the weeks immediately following publication of the CIGNA opinion,
numerous interpretations and comments were offered by, among others,

* This article was written following the United States Supreme Court’s Decision in CIGNA Corp. v.
Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866 (2011), and in response to a previous article by the author concerning ERISA
Plan Documents, Michael A. Valenza, Accuracy is Not a Lot to Ask: Decisions in the Second and Third
Circuits Set the Tone for Litigation Over Conflicts Between ERISA Plan Documents and Summaries, 6
TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 361 (2005).
** Assistant Professor, Temple University, Fox School of Business.
1

CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866 (2011). Justice Scalia filed a concurring opinion in which
Justice Thomas joined. Justice Sotomayor took no part in the decision. Id.

2 See generally Burke v. Kodak Ret. Income Plan, 336 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1105
(2004).
3

CIGNA, 131 S. Ct. at 1876-78.

4

Id. at 1878-83.

139

140

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[VOL. 13

organizations whose members may be affected by the Court’s ruling.5 Interestingly,
it seems that the commentators, regardless of their specific employer- or employeerelated interests, all find something favorable to those interests in the Court’s lengthy
and multi-faceted ruling.6 Whether the various interpretations are justified, they
suggest that perhaps the Court’s ruling may not be the final note on the issues it
decided in this case.
Before addressing the facts specific to CIGNA Corporation’s ERISAgoverned plan, a brief historical perspective may clarify ERISA’s purpose and assist
in understanding the kinds of factual circumstances under which conflicts have
arisen in the past and may arise in the future.7 Since the enactment of ERISA in
1974,8 the common law surrounding its disclosure requirements has both clarified
and, in some cases, complicated the distribution of rights and obligations under the
Act.9 Courts have recognized that appropriate plan disclosure is an essential element
of the statute and have upheld suits brought by plan participants and beneficiaries
aimed at enforcing the disclosed terms of benefit plans.10 The circuit courts are

5

See, e.g., Arthur D. Postal, Supreme Court Favors CIGNA in Summary Plan Description Case,
LIFEHEALTHPRO (May 16, 2011), http://www.lifehealthpro.com/2011/05/16/supreme-courtfavors-cigna-in-summary-plan-descrip; Supreme Court Decision in Amara v. CIGNA a Victory for Workers
and Retirees, PENSION RIGHTS CENTER (May 16, 2011), http://www.pensionrights.org/newsroom/
releases/supreme-court-decision-amara-v-cigna-victory-workers-and-retirees.
6

See sources cited supra note 5.

7

See generally Charles R. Peterson, ERISA Does Not Give Employers a Free Pass: Refusing to Place the Burden
of Careless Drafting on the Employee, 9 NEV. L.J. 704 (2009) (addressing the reliance standard in ERISA
plan and summary conflicts); Michael A. Valenza, Accuracy Is Not a Lot to Ask: Decisions in the Second and
Third Circuits Set the Tone for Litigation over Conflicts Between ERISA Plan Documents and Summaries, 6
TENN. J. BUS. L. 361 (2005) (addressing cases arising from conflicting ERISA plan and summary
disputes).
8

See generally Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the United States Code, including 29 U.S.C. §§
1001-1461 and 26 U.S.C. §§ 401-415 and 4972-4975).

9

See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989) (explaining that “courts are
to develop a ‘federal common law of rights and obligations under ERISA-regulated plans.’” (quoting
Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987)). See generally Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr.
Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983).
10

See Jensen v. SIPCO, Inc., 38 F.3d 945, 952 (8th Cir. 1994) (“Adequate disclosure to employees is
one of ERISA’s major purposes.”); see also Layaou v. Xerox Corp., 238 F.3d 205, 211 (2d Cir. 2001)
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unified in ruling that terms of the Summary Plan Description (“SPD”), an overview
document that describes plan benefits and obligations in lay terms,11 override
conflicting terms in the Plan Document (“Plan”), the more complex and
comprehensive document typically written in professional jargon.12
Employees who participate in ERISA-sponsored welfare or pension plans
usually receive a copy of the SPD and not the lengthy Plan itself.13 Courts have
recognized that because employees may only have these summaries to consult before
making important decisions regarding employment, health care, and retirement,14 the
summaries should be written accurately, distributed promptly, and made binding not
only on the plan participant, but also on the Plan and its administrators.15 However,
the same courts disagree about what elements are necessary to succeed on a claim for
benefits denied or otherwise withheld.16 Thus, the circuit in which a claim is brought
determines whether a plaintiff must show some form of reliance, detriment, or a
(“[E]mployees are entitled to rely on the SPDs as their primary source of information about their
benefits.”).
11

29 U.S.C. § 1022(a) mandates that the summary plan description “shall be written in a manner
calculated to be understood by the average plan participant, and shall be sufficiently accurate and
comprehensive to reasonably apprise such participants and beneficiaries of their rights and obligations
under the plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a) (2006). Section 1022(b) delineates the specific items that must
be addressed in the SPD, the most important of which for the topic at hand are “circumstances which
may result in disqualification, ineligibility, or denial or loss of benefits.” Id. § 1022(b). Corresponding
federal regulations provide a more detailed list of items required in an SPD, and specify the manner in
which they are to be presented. 29 C.F.R. §§ 2520.102-2, 2520.102-3 (2010).
12

Valenza, supra note 7, at 367-75.

13

See 29 U.S.C. § 1021(a) (2006) (“The administrator of each employee benefit plan shall cause to be
furnished in accordance with section 1024(b) of this title to each participant covered under the plan
and to each beneficiary who is receiving benefits under the plan: (1) a summary plan description
described in section 1022(a)(1) of this title.”).

14

See Burstein v. Ret. Account Plan for Employees of Allegheny Health Educ. Research Found., 334
F.3d 365, 379 (3d Cir. 2003) (“The SPD is the document to which the lay employee is likely to refer in
obtaining information about the plan and in making decisions affected by the terms of the plan.”); see
also Senkier v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 948 F.2d 1050, 1051 (7th Cir. 1991) (“Nothing in
ERISA requires that the insurance policy summarized in the summary plan document be given the
insured.”).

15
16

See Burstein, 334 F.3d at 378.

Id. at 380 (the plan participant need not plead reliance on the SPD). But see Senkier, 948 F.2d at 1051
(the participant must rely on the SPD).
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combination of the two as a result of a conflict between an SPD provision and the
Plan language.
While the circuit courts that have addressed this question have crafted their
decisions when Plans have been contradicted by SPDs,17 document conflicts where
the documents in question are other than the SPDs have not been decided. Thus,
the Supreme Court’s decision in CIGNA does appear to be making new law on that
issue; that is, an SPD may consist of more than a single summary plan description.18
The Supreme Court, however, did so much more than recognize the relevance of
employer or plan documents and communications other than “Plans” and “SPDs.”
Its decision in CIGNA clarified the legal standard applicable to claims brought by
employees and other beneficiaries, and, in so doing, it essentially reversed multiple
prior circuit court rulings.19 Its decision also effectively restricted litigation based
upon one of ERISA’s remedy sections, while simultaneously opening up another
section to ERISA plaintiffs.20
In analyzing the CIGNA decision, it is useful to examine the legislature’s
purpose in enacting ERISA. Congress declared that one of its goals in enacting
ERISA was:
[T]o protect . . . the interests of participants in employee benefit
plans and their beneficiaries, by requiring the disclosure and reporting
to participants and beneficiaries of financial and other information
with respect thereto, by establishing standards of conduct,
responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit
plans, and by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and
ready access to the Federal courts.21
While Congress was expansive in explaining the purpose and function of the
ERISA legislation,22 it was peculiarly reticent to prescribe a clear roadmap to be
followed by the courts when those plan participants, employees, and beneficiaries
17

Valenza, supra note 7, at 367-76.

18

See CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866, 1877 (2011).

19

Id. at 1880-82.

20

Id. at 1878-80.

21

29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2006).

22

Id.
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were the apparent victims of ERISA violations. One might reasonably assume that
the Congress was indeed allowing the courts to create a federal common law for
such matters. While the Supreme Court’s opinion in CIGNA would on its face
appear to follow this Congressional declaration, the seemingly incongruously
favorable remarks coming from opposite elements of ERISA-governed parties
suggest that the import of the Court’s decision upon the lower courts is yet to be
seen. Whether CIGNA will encourage more litigation rather than result in less is
likewise an unknown.
II.

CIGNA CORPORATION’S ERISA VIOLATIONS: FACTUAL BASIS AND
LOWER COURT RULING

Because the Court was very clear in stating that its “decision rest[ed] in
important part upon the circumstances present,”23 the facts surrounding this class
action lawsuit must be explicitly described and understood. Prior to 1998, CIGNA
Corporation (“CIGNA”) had an ERISA-governed pension plan that provided a
defined benefit for its retiring employees in the form of an annuity calculated on the
basis of pre-retirement salary and length of service.24 In November 1997, CIGNA
announced via a newsletter that the pension plan would terminate on December 31,
1997 and that a new plan would go into effect on January 1, 1998, although the
details of the new plan would not be explained to the employees until later in 1998.25
Almost a year later, CIGNA supplied the plan details,26 which showed that the new
plan, contrary to the statements made in the newsletter, had the potential to reduce
individual benefits.27 CIGNA also failed to explain to employees the potential for
“wear away,” a phenomenon whereby a drop in interest rates would reduce
individual account values and would require additional years of contributions to
make up the loss.28 In response to these inconsistencies, Janice Amara and the
23

CIGNA, 131 S. Ct. at 1871.

24

Id.

25

Id.

26

Id.

27

Id. at 73. The newsletter provided (1) that full benefits earned as of December 31, 1997 would be
deposited to the newly created individual employee accounts, (2) that retirement benefits would be the
same or improved, and (3) that CIGNA would not see a cost saving. See id. at 1872-73.
28

Id. at 1874.
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several other named plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of some 25,000 current and
retired employees of CIGNA, instituted a class action lawsuit against the
corporation.29 The plaintiffs claimed that CIGNA violated several of its ERISA
obligations with respect to changes it made to its retirement plan.30
Because CIGNA did not provide thorough, or even less than thorough,
explanations of these aspects of the new plan and the risks to the employees, the
district court found not only that the plan descriptions “were incomplete and
inaccurate,” but also that “CIGNA intentionally misled its employees.”31 The district
court concluded, as a matter of law, that CIGNA violated ERISA Sections 204(h),
102(a) and 104(b) as they existed in 1997-98.32 Section 204(h) “forbade an
amendment of a pension plan that would ‘provide for a significant reduction in the
rate of future benefit accrual’ unless the plan administrator also sent a ‘written notice’
that provided either the text of the amendment or summarized its likely effects.”33
CIGNA had not supplied its employees with such a timely written notice.34 Sections
102(a) and 104(b), “require a plan administrator to provide beneficiaries with
summary plan descriptions and with summaries of material modifications, ‘written in
a manner calculated to be understood by the average plan participant,’ that are
‘sufficiently accurate and comprehensive to reasonably apprise such participants and
beneficiaries of their rights and obligations.’”35 CIGNA again failed to provide its
employees with the requisite summary materials.36
Having found, as a matter of law, that CIGNA violated its ERISA-mandated
obligations, the district court proceeded to consider the remedies available to fashion
the proper relief.37 Justice Breyer related the district court’s five holdings regarding
relief afforded to the plaintiff class members: “(1) that the evidence presented [at
29

Id. at 1870.

30

Id.

31

Id. at 1874.

32

Id. at 1874-75.

33

Id. at 1874. (citations omitted).

34

Id.

35

Id. at 1874-75 (quoting 29 U.S.C. §§ 1022(a), 1024(b) (2006 ed. and Supp. III)).

36

Id. at 1874.

37

Id. at 1875.
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trial] had raised a presumption of ‘likely harm’ suffered by the members of the
relevant employee class, and . . . that CIGNA, though free to offer contrary evidence
in respect to some or all of those employees, had failed to rebut that
presumption[;]”38 (2) “that the notices in respect to the freezing of old-plan benefits,
effective December 31, 1997, were valid[;]”39 (3) “the terms of the new plan’s
guarantee” would be reformed so as to provide employees with both a guaranteed
annuity and new plan benefits;40 (4) that all class members would receive the
guaranteed annuity plus new-plan benefits;41 and (5) that ERISA Section 502(a)(1)(B)
authorized the foregoing elements of relief.42
The plaintiffs and CIGNA cross-appealed the district court’s judgment to the
Second Circuit.43 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in a brief opinion,
affirmed the district court’s ruling, commending the district court’s “well-reasoned
and scholarly opinions.”44 The parties filed cross-petitions for writs of certiorari to
the U.S. Supreme Court.45 The Court granted CIGNA’s petition “to consider
whether a showing of ‘likely harm’ is sufficient to entitle plan participants to recover
benefits based on faulty disclosures.”46 The Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari
certainly indicated that it would decide the applicable legal standard in determining
prejudice, which was the issue decided by the Second Circuit’s 2003 decision in Burke

38

Id.

39

Id. The district court had distinguished the notice of the freezing of old-plan benefits, which was
valid, from the new-plan notice, which was invalid. Id.

40

Id.

41

Id.

42

Id. Since the district court held that it was authorized by section 502(a)(1)(B) to provide the relief it
had fashioned, that court did not reach the question of whether it was also authorized to provide
relief pursuant to section 502(a)(3). The district court assumed relief would not have been available as
compensatory damages under section 502(a)(3) and further that section 502(a)(3) relief would not be
possible where a remedy had been found under section 502(a)(1)(B). Amara v. CIGNA Corp. 559 F.
Supp. 2d 192, 205 (D. Conn. 2008) (citing Wilkins v. Mason Tenders Dist. Council Pension Fund, 445
F.3d 572, 578 (2d Cir. 2006)).

43

CIGNA, 131 S. Ct. at 1876.

44

Amara v. CIGNA Corp., 348 F. App’x. 627 (2d Cir. 2009).

45

CIGNA, 131 S. Ct. at 1876.

46

Id.
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v. Kodak Retirement Income Plan.47 Of course, the Supreme Court’s opinion did much
more than effectively reverse Burke and the other circuit courts on the requisite legal
standard.48
The entry of the U.S. Supreme Court at this juncture, in light of its prior
reticence to decide this and related questions, suggests at the very least that the
Supreme Court did not earlier feel compelled to resolve what became a split among
the circuits on the issue of conflicts between plan documents and SPDs. In fact, as
will be seen with the Second Circuit’s decision in Burke—from which the Supreme
Court refused to hear an appeal—by the time Burke was decided by the Second
Circuit in 2003 and the Supreme Court allowed that decision to stand (in 2004), it
appeared that the Supreme Court had more than intimated its position.49 However,
the Supreme Court’s decision in CIGNA may suggest not so much a change in
position as a recognition of the need to correct the lower courts’ inaccurate
assessments of the Supreme Court’s earlier decisions. The following circuit court
opinions on the question of conflicts between plan documents and SPDs, along with
the issue of whether proof of reliance and prejudice (whether actual or likely) are
requisite elements of successful ERISA claims, set the stage for the Supreme Court’s
ruling in CIGNA.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE APPLICABLE STANDARD, WHETHER LIKELY
PREJUDICE/HARMLESS ERROR, RELIANCE, OR ACTUAL HARM, AS THE
REQUIREMENT FOR RELIEF
A. Prior Circuit Court Decisions
One of the earliest of the circuit court cases was Govoni v. Bricklayers, Masons
and Plasterers International Union,50 in which the First Circuit held that, while the SPD
did not accurately reflect the Plan, plaintiff Govoni was not entitled to relief because
he was unable to “show some significant reliance upon, or possible prejudice flowing
from, the faulty plan description.”51 Govoni had been a member of the union from
47 Burke v. Kodak Ret. Income Plan, 336 F.3d 103, 106 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1105
(2004).
48

See generally CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866 (2011).

49

See generally Burke, 336 F.3d 103.

50

732 F.2d 250 (1st Cir. 1984).

51

Id. at 252.
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1951 until his retirement in 1979, with a break in service between 1962 and 1966.52
The union amended its pension rules in 1976 (in response to the then newly enacted
ERISA), and its new pension rules would have given Govoni credit for the break
years that would not have figured into Govoni’s pension credits under the older
rules.53 The First Circuit concluded that Govoni could not have relied upon, and
could not be prejudiced by, a rule change that had not yet been made.54
Additional First Circuit decisions held firmly to the requirement of reliance
or prejudice. In Bachelder v. Communications Satellite Corp.,55 the court ruled that an
SPD provision regarding a cash payment option for employee-owned stock was
ambiguous, but there could be no recovery by the employees who “did not show
significant reliance or even the possibility of prejudice flowing from the SPD.”56
Several years later, the First Circuit decided Mauser v. Raytheon Co. Pension Plan for
salaried Employees., a case in which the plaintiff-employee, again, had made several
financial decisions arguably in expectation of receiving a certain level of pension
benefits.57 The plaintiff in Mauser argued in the district court that he purchased a
vacation home and expended funds on his daughter’s wedding with the expectation
of receiving certain pension benefits.58 On appeal, the circuit court ruled that Mauser
had not relied on the SPD to such an extent that it created a “measurable prejudice”
and that “the mere forming of an expectation as to benefits is not enough.”59
The Fourth,60 Seventh,61 Eighth,62 Tenth,63 and Eleventh64 Circuits adopted
the Govoni rule requiring either reliance or prejudice. However, the Second,65 Third,66

52

Id. at 251.

53

Id.

54

Id. at 252-53.

55

837 F.2d 519 (1st Cir. 1988).

56

Id. at 522-23 (citing Govoni, 732 F.2d at 252).

57

See Mauser v. Raytheon Co. Pension Plan for Salaried Employees, 239 F.3d 51, 53-54 (1st Cir.
2001).
58

Id. at 53.

59

Id. at 56 (citing Bachelder, 837 F.2d at 523 n.6).

60

See Aiken v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 13 F.3d 138, 141 (4th Cir. 1993).

61

See Health Cost Controls, Inc. v. Washington, 187 F.3d 703, 711 (7th Cir. 1999) (in which the court
clarified its position on a plan-summary description conflict by stating that the plan governs unless the
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and Fifth67 Circuits rejected the rule, and the Sixth68 and Ninth69 Circuits did not
clearly decide the issue. The CIGNA plaintiffs pointed to this latter group in their
appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, arguing that the more modern analysis of the
Plan-SPD conflict issue of the Burke (Second Circuit) and Burstein (Third Circuit)
courts should be favored.70 After all, it was the Burke decision that the Supreme
Court chose not to accept for appeal some years earlier.71
The Burstein decision was more employee-favorable than the Burke decision.
In Burnstein, the district court had ruled that benefits could not possibly be recovered
from a Plan based upon benefits supposedly granted pursuant to the related SPD or

employee or beneficiary has reasonably relied on the summary plan description to his detriment,
indicating that both reliance and prejudice are required).
62 See Maxa v. John Alden Life Ins. Co., 972 F.2d 980, 984 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing with approval Monson
v. Century Mfg. Co., 739 F.2d 1293, 1302 (8th Cir. 1984) (“’[E]vidence of detrimental reliance must
show that the plaintiff [ ] took action, resulting in some detriment, that [he] would not have taken had
[he] known [that the terms of the plan were otherwise],’ or that he failed, to his detriment, to take
action that he would have taken had he known that the terms of the plan were otherwise.”) (alteration
in original) (citation omitted)).
63 See Chiles v. Ceridian Corp., 95 F.3d 1505, 1519 (10th Cir. 1996) (in which the court addressed not
only issues of whether the employees were vested at the time the plan administrator changed the
terms of the plan and whether a reservation of rights would be valid, but also that the employees
could only secure relief if they had relied upon a faulty SPD or had shown prejudice arising from the
inconsistency between the SPD and the Plan).
64

See Branch v. G. Bernd Co., 955 F.2d 1574, 1579 (11th Cir. 1992).

65

See Burke v. Kodak Ret. Income Plan, 336 F.3d 103, 113-14 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1105
(2004).

66

See Burstein v. Ret. Account Plan for Employees of Allegheny Health Educ. & Research Found.,
334 F.3d 365, 380 (3d Cir. 2003).
67

See Rhorer v. Raytheon Eng’rs. & Constructors, Inc., 181 F.3d 634, 644 n.12 (5th Cir. 1999).

68

See, e.g., Helwig v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 93 F.3d 243, 247 (6th Cir. 1996).

69

See generally Bergt v. Ret. Plan for Pilots Employed by MarkAir, Inc., 293 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2002).

70

See CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866, 1881-82 (2011); see also Burnstein, 334 F.3d at 376-78
(discussing conflict between terms of the SPD and terms of the Plan Document); Burke, 336 F.3d at
110 (“Where the terms of a plan and the SPD conflict, the SPD controls.”).
71

See Kodak Ret. Income Plan v. Burke, 540 U.S. 1105 (2004).
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other secondary documents.72 The Third Circuit, in reversing the district court,
stated, “Today, we join with the other Courts of Appeals that have considered this
issue, and hold that, where a summary plan description conflicts with the plan
language, it is the summary plan description that will control.”73 Furthermore, a
claimant seeking plan benefits need not plead nor prove reliance upon the SPD,74 or
upon such other secondary document as may have contained the conflicting benefit
information (as the Third Circuit did not restrict its holding to SPDs alone).75 The
“other Courts of Appeals” to which the Burstein court referred were those of the
Fourth,76 Fifth,77 Ninth,78 and Eleventh Circuits.79
Compared to the Burstein court, the Burke court was somewhat less generous
to employees and plan beneficiaries. While the Second Circuit apparently agreed
with the district court’s finding that reliance was not an essential element of proof
and recovery, the Second Circuit ruled that recovery would require prejudice, but
that a contradictory SPD creates prejudice as a matter of law.80 The court provided
additional context to its prejudice requirement: “Cognizant of ERISA’s distribution
of benefits, we require, for a showing of prejudice, that a plan participant or
beneficiary was likely to have been harmed as a result of a deficient SPD.”81 The
Second Circuit further expanded on its ruling by at least indirectly pointing to the
need for some injury or damage to the plaintiff before a recovery can be awarded,
72

See Burstein., 334 F.3d at 373-74.

73

Id. at 378. See generally Barker v. Ceridian Corp., 122 F.3d 628 (8th Cir. 1997); Chiles v. Ceridian
Corp., 95 F.3d 1505 (10th Cir. 1996); Atwood v. Newmont Gold Co., 45 F.3d 1317 (9th Cir. 1995);
Pierce v. Sec. Trust Life Ins. Co., 979 F.2d 23 (4th Cir. 1992); Senkier v. Hartford Life & Accident
Ins. Co., 948 F.2d 1050 (7th Cir. 1991); Hansen v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 940 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1991);
Heidgerd v. Olin Corp., 906 F.2d 903 (2d Cir. 1990); Edwards v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 851
F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1988); McKnight v. S. Life & Health Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 1566 (11th Cir. 1985).
74

Burnstein, 334 F.3d at 380.

75

Id.

76

See Aiken v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 13 F.3d 138, 140 (4th Cir. 1993).

77

Hansen v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 940 F.2d 971, 981-82 (5th Cir, 1991).

78

Atwood, 45 F.3d at 1321.

79

Chiles v. Ceridian Corp., 95 F.3d 1505, 1515 (10th Cir. 1996).

80

Burke v. Kodak Ret. Income Plan, 336 F.3d 103, 111-12 (2d Cir. 2003).

81

Id. at 113 (emphasis in original).
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stating that “the employer may rebut [the likelihood of prejudice] through evidence
that the deficient SPD was in effect a harmless error.”82
When the Supreme Court elected not to take the Burke appeal, it left in place
several elements: first, an employee or plan beneficiary could present a claim based
upon an SPD or other summary document that conflicted with the Plan itself;83
second, the employee or plan beneficiary would be required to show prejudice;84
third, the standard of proof for a showing of prejudice was that the employee or plan
beneficiary was likely to have been harmed as a result of the deficient SPD (or other
summary document);85 fourth, proof of actual harm was not required;86 fifth, reliance
by the employee or plan beneficiary upon the SPD was unnecessary;87 but, sixth, the
employer could defend a claim by an affirmative showing that the employee or plan
beneficiary had not suffered actual harm, i.e., the erroneous summary plan
description was harmless.88
B. CIGNA v. Amara
The Second Circuit had not yet had the opportunity to render these
conclusions when CIGNA converted its defined-benefit retirement plan to a new
and different “cash balance account” plan in 1998.89 Although, by 1998, it was
reasonably clear from the various circuit court opinions that SPDs would be the
operative documents only when there was a conflict with the terms of the Plan, it
was unclear what a plaintiff would be required to prove in order to prevail, i.e.,
regarding reliance, prejudice, and likely or actual injury.90 It was also clear by 1998

82

Id.

83

See id. at 110.

84

Id. at 111-12.

85

Id. at 113-14.

86

See id.

87

Id. at 112.

88

Id. at 113.

89

See CIGNA Corp., v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866, 1870 (2011).

90

See, e.g., Helwig v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 93 F.3d 243, 247 (6th Cir. 1996).
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that plan modifications did not create ERISA violations so long as the modifications
were made in accordance with ERISA and in a timely manner.91
CIGNA’s plan changes did, however, create a situation in which vested
benefits might be reduced.92 Moreover, notices of those changes, through the
newsletter or otherwise, were untimely and erroneous.93 The Supreme Court found
no reason to disturb the factual findings made by the district court regarding
timeliness (or lack thereof) and employer-generated misinformation.94 The Supreme
Court cited with approval the conclusions of the district court regarding the
underlying facts of the case and CIGNA’s violation of ERISA Sections 102(a),
104(b), and 204(h).95
The Supreme Court limited its review of the underlying case to two issues:
first, “whether the District Court applied the correct legal standard, namely a ‘likely
harm’ standard, in determining that CIGNA’s notice violations caused its employees
sufficient injury to warrant legal relief,”96 and second, “whether the ERISA section . .
. mentioned (ERISA’s recovery-of-benefits-due provision, section 502(a)(1)(B))
authorizes entry of the relief the District Court provided.”97 While the Supreme
Court answered both of these questions in the negative, seemingly finding in favor of
CIGNA, the Court offered an alternative basis for relief, namely, section 502(a)(3),
91 See, e.g., Wise v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 986 F.2d 929, 934 (5th Cir. 1993) (“It is undisputed that
nothing in ERISA requires an SPD to reference amendment rights or procedures.”). The court found
that plan administrators are free to amend the terms of plans, even if the benefits to non-vested
employees are diminished or deleted, so long as the administrators follow the ERISA-prescribed
scheme for doing so, and so long as vested benefits are not touched. Id.
92

See CIGNA.,131 S. Ct. at 1873.

93

Id. at 1872-73.

94

See id. at 1871.

95

Id. (“[T]he interested reader can find a more thorough description [of the circumstances] in two
District Court opinions, which set forth that court’s findings reached after a lengthy trial.” (citations
omitted)); see also id. at 1874 (“The District Court concluded, as a matter of law, that CIGNA’s
representations (and omissions) about the plan, made between November 1997 (when it announced
the plan) and December 1998 (when it put the plan into effect) violated: (a) ERISA § 204(h) . . . and
(b) ERISA §§ 102(a) and 104(b).”).
96
97

Id. at 1871.

Id. at 1871. The Supreme Court, in addressing these two issues, would essentially also decide
whether detrimental reliance is a necessary consideration.
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and remanded the case.98 When the answer to the latter issue is linked with those
aspects of the district court’s opinion that the Supreme Court left undisturbed, the
Supreme Court’s decision presents a mixed bag of results for both sides to this
dispute. What the district court does on remand will more likely define the favored
party.
IV. SECTION 502(A)(3) RATHER THAN SECTION 502(A)(1)(B) IS THE
APPROPRIATE ERISA SECTION FOR INDIVIDUALIZED EQUITABLE RELIEF
The district court secured relief for the CIGNA employees and plan
beneficiaries by using section 502(a)(1)(B) to reform the Plan and then ordering the
plan administrator (CIGNA) to provide benefits in accordance with the reformed
plan, but the Supreme Court rejected any authority existing pursuant to section
502(a)(1)(B) to change a plan.99 “That provision states that a ‘civil action may be
brought’ by a plan ‘participant or beneficiary . . . to recover benefits due to him
under the terms of his plan.’”100 However, there is nothing in that section that
authorizes a plan reformation.101 Reformation, if possible, would need to be based
upon some other section of ERISA.102 The Supreme Court reasoned further that the
recovery of benefits due under a “plan” means just that; that is, the Plan and not the
SPD contains the benefits due.103 Section 502(a)(1)(B) can be used to enforce the
terms of the Plan but not the terms of the SPD:
[W]e cannot agree that the terms of statutorily required plan
summaries (or summaries of plan modifications) necessarily may be
enforced (under § 502(a)(1)(B)) as the terms of the plan itself. . . .
[T]he information about the plan provided by those disclosures [in
summary plan descriptions] is not itself part of the plan. Nothing in §

98

Id.; ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(3) (2006).

99

CIGNA, 131 S. Ct. at 1871, 1878.

100

Id. at 1875-76.

101

Id. at 1878.

102

See Id.

103

Id. at 1877.
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502(a)(1)(B) (or, as far as we can tell, anywhere else) suggests the
contrary.104
The district court’s award, based upon the plan as reformed, could not be
approved if section 502(a)(1)(B) does not provide the authority for a court to reform
a plan in the first instance.105 Without any authority found in section 502(a)(1)(B) to
reform the plan, and concluding that the SPD (and other descriptive documents,
such as the CIGNA newsletter) is not the Plan, the Supreme Court looked elsewhere
for the statutory support upon which the district court might base a decision
providing relief to the CIGNA employees and the plan beneficiaries.106 The
Supreme Court found this support in section 502(a)(3).107 That section authorizes a
civil action to be filed by a participant, a beneficiary, or an administrator to obtain
other appropriate equitable relief to redress violations of ERISA or to enforce any
provisions of a plan’s terms.108 This would include a claim for breach of fiduciary
duty.109
The district court had not utilized section 502(a)(3) because it determined
that a remedy for the plaintiffs could be found in section 502(a)(1)(B) and because
the scope of section 502(a)(3) had been narrowed.110 The district court likely
assumed that Mertens v. Hewitt Associates,111 a 1993 Supreme Court decision, precluded
an award of compensatory damages because “categories of relief that were typically
available in equity” are limited to such classic equitable remedies as injunction,

104

Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).

105

Id. at 1871.

106

Id. at 1878. The Supreme Court’s majority opinion could have ended with the determination that
section 501(a)(1)(B) simply does not provide the authority to provide the relief allowed by the district
court. As Justice Scalia noted in his concurring opinion, with which Justice Thomas joined, “Why the
Court embarks on this peculiar path is beyond me.” Id. at 1884 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia
then refers to the majority’s section 502(a)(3) discussion as “blatant dictum.” Id. (Scalia, J.,
concurring).

107

Id. at 1871, 1878-80.

108

Id. at 1876.

109

Id. at 1881. See also Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 510-513 (1996).

110

CIGNA, 131 S. Ct. at 1876.

111

508 U.S. 248 (1993).
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mandamus, or restitution.112 Compensatory damages would not be available in
equity.113 However, in Mertens, the plan participants had brought suit against a nonfiduciary actuary who had been involved with the plan fiduciary in that fiduciary’s
ERISA violation.114 The plaintiffs brought suit pursuant to section 502(a)(3) to
recover the monetary loss suffered by the plan.115 They did not base their claim
upon section 502(a)(2) because that section was applicable to fiduciaries and not to a
non-fiduciary such as Hewitt Associates.116 The Supreme Court, in limiting relief
available under section 502(a)(3) to those remedies typically available in equity (thus
not monetary damages), and further in not identifying alternative sections under
which monetary relief might be available,117 generated years of misinterpretation, or
at least non-understanding, of the full range of remedies available under ERISA.
The Court in Mertens gave little direction to the lower courts in how to fashion
equitable relief so that a reasonable interpretation of Mertens would be the nonavailability of monetary relief, rather than a roadmap of how to structure equitable
relief.118
Almost ten years after the Court’s decision in Mertens, the Supreme Court was
again asked, in Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson,119 to identify the
nature of equitable relief available to a plaintiff under section 502(a)(3). In GreatWest, the plaintiff health insurance company sought reimbursement from its insured
from an underlying personal injury lawsuit recovery.120 Justice Scalia, writing for the
majority, qualified the insurance company’s claim as “the kind of restitution . . . that .
. . is not equitable,” as was claimed by Great-West.121 Relief was therefore

112

Id. at 256 (emphasis in original).

113

Id.

114

Id. at 250.

115

Id. at 253.

116

Id. at 252-53.

117

See id. at 256-58.

118

See id.

119

534 U.S. 204 (2002).

120

Id.

121

Id. At 214.
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unavailable as “other equitable relief” under section 502(a)(3).122 “[F]or restitution to
lie in equity, the action generally must seek not to impose personal liability on the
defendant, but to restore to the plaintiff particular funds or property in the
defendant’s possession.”123 Justice Scalia proceeded to explain this distinction
between law and equity by reference to recognized standard texts on equity and to
the Restatements.124 While the Court’s explanation may have been necessary in
response to the nature of the claim brought by Great-West, Justice Scalia’s references
to the current treatises on equity and trust law may not have created the kind of
roadmap needed by the lower courts.
As an example of the continuing difficulty faced by the lower courts in
deciding whether a suit is one at law or in equity, the Second Circuit in Pereira v.
Farace,125 in determining whether a jury trial was guaranteed by the Seventh
Amendment, stated:
First, we ask “whether the action would have been deemed legal or equitable
in 18th century England.” Second, “we examine the remedy sought and determine
whether it is legal or equitable in nature.” We then “balance the two, giving greater
weight to the latter.” . . . After three decades of grappling with the law versus equity
analysis, the late Justice William Brennan threw up his hands. He had wearied of
“rattling through dusty attics of ancient writs” and suggested that Seventh
Amendment jurisprudence should sever its dependence on historical analogies to
English common law as it existed in 1791. However much we may sympathize with
his position, Justice Brennan’s suggestion has gone unheeded, and thus, we are left to
scour through the “dusty attics” ourselves.126
Notwithstanding the apparent confusion that was generated by Mertens and
Great-West, Justice Breyer quickly distinguished those cases as being outside the realm
of trust law and therefore being claims strictly for monetary relief.127 Justice Breyer’s
opinion in CIGNA reiterates the distinction:
122

Id. at 218.

123

Id. at 214.

124

Id. at 213-14.

125

413 F.3d 330 (2d Cir. 2005).

126

Id. at 337-38 (citations omitted).

127

CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866, 1878-79 (2011).
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The case before us concerns a suit by a beneficiary against a plan
fiduciary (whom ERISA typically treats as a trustee) about the terms
of a plan (which ERISA typically treats as a trust). It is the kind of
lawsuit that, before the merger of law and equity, respondents could
have brought only in a court of equity, not a court of law. With the
exception of the relief now provided by § 502(a)(1)(B), the remedies
available to those courts of equity were traditionally considered
equitable remedies.128
While reformation is a recognized equitable remedy, it is not authorized by
section 502(a)(1)(B).129 The district court, therefore, did not have the authority
pursuant to section 502(a)(1)(B) to fashion the relief it granted.130 Only section
502(a)(3) would authorize the kind of relief made available by the district court, and
if the district court had distinguished CIGNA from Mertens, it would likely have
utilized this section in granting relief.131 Justice Breyer calls attention to the current
but traditional texts in directing the lower court in determining what, if any,
“appropriate equitable relief” might be available to plaintiffs such as those in
CIGNA.132 While Justice Breyer did not dictate the choice of remedies, he did offer
one specifically as a possible other equitable remedy, namely, surcharge.133
Consequently, even though the availability of section 502(a)(3) was not presented on
appeal to the Supreme Court in CIGNA, and even though surcharge was not
presented as a possible form of relief by the appellants or briefed by the parties, the
applicability of section 502(a)(3) was discussed in depth at oral argument and the
concept of surcharge was raised by the majority.134 The majority opinion, without
the approval of Justices Scalia and Thomas, provides clear direction to the lower

128

Id. at 1879 (citations omitted).

129

See ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2006).

130

CIGNA, 131 S. Ct. at 1878. See generally ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2006).

131

CIGNA, 131 S. Ct. at 1882. See generally ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2006); Mertens
v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248 (1993).

132

See CIGNA, 131 S. Ct. 1878-80.

133

Id. at 1880.

134

See generally id.
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courts as to where they might find a conceptual basis for “other appropriate
equitable relief.”135
Justices Scalia and Thomas may have correctly characterized the majority
opinion related to section 502(a)(3) as “blatant dictum,” but it was possibly the
Supreme Court itself that created the circumstances that now explain and justify the
Court’s extended reasoning in CIGNA.136 After all, the Supreme Court in 2004
denied certiorari in Burke when the “likely harm” standard could have been
rejected.137 Likewise, Mertens, Great-West, and numerous other cases138 presented the
Supreme Court with the opportunity to clarify once and for all (1) what kind of relief
is available under section 502(a)(1)(B), (2) that recovery under that section is
restricted to reimbursing the “trust,” and (3) whether section 502(a)(3) authorizes the
“trust” and individual plan participants to secure “make-whole relief.”139
A. Actual Harm, But Without Detrimental Reliance, is Required Under Section 502(a)(3)
The precedent-creating Second Circuit case since 2004 is Burke.140 That case
set forth the standard that recovery of benefits pursuant to an ERISA-governed Plan
requires a showing of prejudice to the employee, but such prejudice would exist, as a
matter of law, when an SPD conflicts with the Plan.141 Prejudice would be

135

See id. at 1878-80.

136

See id. at 1884.

137

See Kodak Ret. Income Plan v. Burke, 540 U.S. 1105 (2004).

138

See generally Susan Harthill, A Square Peg in a Round Hole: Whether Traditional Trust Law “Make-Whole”
Relief is Available Under ERISA Section 502(a)(3), 61 OKLA. L. REV. 721 (2008) (discussing Amschwand
v. Spherion Corp., 128 S. Ct. 2995 (2008)). This article, with its analysis of Amschwand and the
Supreme Court decisions leading up to the denial of certiorari in that case (at issue was “whether a
participant or beneficiary in an employee welfare benefit plan is entitled to individualized monetary
relief for losses caused by a fiduciary breach”), contains a review of trust law principles and suggests
that the application of trust law principles to section 502(a)(3) litigation is far more complicated than
was implied by Justice Scalia in Great-West (Justice Breyer’s opinion in CIGNA would probably also
have been similarly referenced by Professor Harthill had it been issued by the time of publication). Id.
at 721.
139

See generally ERISA §§ 502(a)(1)(B), 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(1)(B), 1132(a)(3) (2006).

140

See generally Burke v. Kodak Ret. Income Plan, 336 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S.
1105 (2004).
141

Id. at 111-13.
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demonstrated upon a showing that the employee was likely to suffer harm;142 proof
of actual harm was not required.143 Conflicting terms of the SPD would then be
enforced by the court.144 The CIGNA opinion changes Burke, and all other contrary
circuit court decisions, and provides a set of guidelines as to the proof required of a
plaintiff.145
The first guideline tells us that the Plan Document contains the terms of the
Plan; everything else simply contains information about the Plan.147 If there is a
conflict between the terms of the Plan and the terms of any other document that
describes the Plan, a court should look to section 502(a)(3) to fashion a resolution of
the dispute.148 Section 502(a)(3) is an equitable remedy provision and is interpreted
in accordance with general principles of equity law.149 “We have interpreted the term
‘appropriate equitable relief’ in section 502(a)(3) as referring to ‘those categories of
relief’ that, traditionally speaking (i.e., prior to the merger of law and equity) ‘were
typically available in equity.’”150 The Supreme Court, citing prominent equity authors
and their works,151 concluded that detrimental reliance, while a necessary element in
an estoppel case, “is not always necessary for other equitable remedies.”152 For
example, contract reformation would not require detrimental reliance where a trustee
breaches his duties to the trust.153 A court would order the trust made whole without
regard to the question of reliance.154 But, in such an instance, the court would make
146

142

Id. at 113.

143

See id.

144

See Id.

145

See generally CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866 (2011).

146

See id. at 1877.

147

See id.

148

See ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. §1132(a)(3) (2006); CIGNA, 131 S. Ct. at 1878-80.

149

See ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. §1132(a)(3) (2006); CIGNA, 131 S. Ct. 1878-80.

150

CIGNA, 131 S. Ct. at 1878 (quoting Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356 (2006)).

151

Id. at 1881.

152

Id.

153

Id.

154

Id.
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the trust whole to the extent the trust was harmed.155 In other circumstances as well,
equity would seem logical when it does not require making whole that which had not
been diminished in some way.156
Recognizing harm and calculating its extent will vary based not only upon the
circumstances by which the harm was caused, but also upon the individuals who fell
victim to the harm.157 The Supreme Court recognized the difficulty and uncertainty
of enforcing the equitable powers of the court in the absence of clarity in ERISA.158
“The relevant substantive provisions of ERISA do not set forth any particular
standard for determining harm. They simply require the plan administrator to write
and to distribute written notices that are ‘sufficiently accurate and comprehensive to
reasonably apprise’ plan participants and beneficiaries of ‘their rights and obligations
under the plan.’”159 Plan participants and beneficiaries would, however, seemingly be
required to prove some degree of actual harm based upon traditional standing rules:
“To have standing, Appellants must suffer an actual harm by the loss of a legally
protected interest; there must be a causal connection between the injury and the
conduct complained of; and it must be likely that the injury will be ‘redressed by a
favorable decision’ by the court.”160 If a claimant cannot demonstrate some
individualized harm, there must be evidence of a deprivation of a right as a result of
a breach of fiduciary duty conferred by ERISA.161
While the Supreme Court has thus dispensed with the requirement of
detrimental reliance, which many of the circuits had previously determined to be a
requisite for successfully challenging the conflicting terms of a Plan, it has mandated
the requirement of actual harm, rather than the lesser standard of likely harm.162 The
opinion of the Court only briefly touches upon the basis for the conclusion that

155

See id.

156

See id.

157

See id.

158

See generally id.

159

Id. at 1881.

160

Schultz v. Windstream Commc’ns, Inc., 600 F.3d 948, 952 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).

161

See Kendall v. Employees Ret. Plan of Avon Prods., 561 F.3d 112, 118-19 (2d Cir. 2009).

162

CIGNA, 131 S. Ct. at 1881-82.
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there must be a showing of actual harm.163 The Court analogizes an award under
section 502(a)(3) as a “surcharge” similar to a surcharge imposed upon a trustee
following the trustee’s breach of trust.164 “To be sure, just as a court of equity would
not surcharge a trustee for a nonexistent harm, a fiduciary can be surcharged under
§ 502(a)(3) only upon a showing of actual harm-proved (under the default rule for
civil cases) by a preponderance of the evidence.”165 The Supreme Court thus made
clear that claims for equitable relief under section 502(a)(3) will require proof of
actual harm.166
With regard to the CIGNA plan participants, the lower court will now
analyze the specific losses to be suffered by those participants and, now
unconstrained by the misinterpretation of the relief available under section 502(a)(3),
will be able to identify compensatory damages and perhaps also reform the CIGNA
Plan.
B. Surcharge
The Court’s introduction of this concept of “surcharge” is itself somewhat
intriguing. It had not been argued by the parties in their briefs, nor was it addressed
in oral argument before the Court.167 Yet, it is this rationale for the allowance of
equitable relief that the Court initiates before sending the case back to the lower
court for further proceedings, presumably to decide whether a surcharge is to be
ordered and, if so, how it is to be calculated.168 The Court looked back to its 1939
decision in Princess Lida of Thurn and Taxis v. Thompson169 for its offer of a “surcharge”
as a possible equitable remedy.170 Interestingly, the Court barely touched upon the
163

Id.

164

Id. at 1881 (citing G. BOGERT ET AL., THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 861 (rev. 2d ed.
1995)).

165

Id. at 1881 (citation omitted).

166

See id. at 1881-82.

167

See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866 (2011) (No. 09804), 2010 WL 4859511; Brief for Petitioner, CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866 (2011) (No.
09-804), 2010 WL 831182; Brief for Respondent, CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866 (2011)
(No. 09-804), 2010 WL 500088.
168

CIGNA, 131 S. Ct. at 1881-82.

169

305 U.S. 456 (1939).

170

CIGNA, 131 S. Ct. at 1880.
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concept in that case.171 The Supreme Court affirmed a decision of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court that had addressed a jurisdictional question and in so doing adopted
the following statement:
An accounting by fiduciaries is in itself a proceeding quasi in rem, in
the sense that it not only adjudicates the legality of the investments
constituting the trust, but also, if it results in a surcharge, orders
payment and restoration of moneys to the trust fund, that is, to the
res. [Such] a surcharge is not a judgment to pay money to individuals
as in an ordinary personal injury action. . . . [I]n other words, the
recovery would be by the trust fund and not by appellants, who can
gain therefrom only upon distribution of the income and ultimately
of the corpus of the trust, as prescribed in the agreement by which it
was created.172
Justice Breyer’s reference to “surcharge” clearly offers the possibility that an
individual plaintiff may sue a fiduciary for monetary damages under section 502(a)(3)
as “other appropriate equitable relief.”173 This provides clarification of what was
previously treated as a section 502(a)(2) restoration of funds to a trust and not made
available for individual victims of a trustee’s breach of fiduciary duties.174 Justice
Breyer’s discussion recognizes that “[a]n action by beneficiaries for a breach of trust
is an equitable proceeding, even if money damages are the only remedy sought.”175
While Justice Breyer’s reference to “surcharge” in the CIGNA opinion is
brief, its impact may be significant. It confirms what some commentators had
already argued, that is, that surcharge is available to individuals as equitable relief
under section 502(a)(3).176 Perhaps the most extensive discussion on the question of
“surcharge” (and “make-whole” relief) is contained in Professor Harthill’s article
reviewing the Amschwand case.177 Her review of the pertinent Restatement of Trust
171

See Lida, 305 U.S. at 463-64.

172

Thompson v. Fitzgerald, 198 A. 58, 66 (Pa. 1938); aff’d by Princess Lida of Thurn & Taxis v.
Thompson, 305 U.S. 456 (1939).

173

CIGNA, 131 S. Ct. at 1876, 1878, 1880 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2006)).

174

See Id. at 1878-79.

175

76 AM. JUR. 2D Trusts § 598 (2011).

176

See infra notes 183-88.

177

Harthill, supra note 138, at 723-24.
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provisions, the Uniform Trust Code of 2000, and the leading trust treatises will
surely inform litigants in future ERISA cases.178 She attributes much of the
confusion in past district and circuit court decisions to the confusing literature that
interchangeably references the concepts of surcharge, compensatory damages,
accounting, and make-whole relief.179 While the CIGNA decision may not have
fleshed out the elements of surcharge—after all, this was dictum—it has crystallized
the issue for the lower courts. As Professor Harthill stated, “It is absurd to think
that Congress would have extended the substantive duties and obligations of a
trustee to ERISA plan fiduciaries but at the same time limit the remedies available
under traditional trust law to those situations where the trust corpus is harmed,”180
and “[c]ertainly, relief for loss to the plan is payable to the plan under ERISA
sections 409 and 502(a)(2).”181 “Relief for these types of cases would, therefore, be
payable to the trust corpus. But the availability of relief payable back into the trust
corpus does not foreclose the availability of relief to the individual beneficiary, as prefusion cases evidence, and which is reflected in ERISA Section 502(a)(3).”182
V.

CONCLUSION

If the Supreme Court’s acceptance of what was essentially CIGNA’s request
for appeal was thought to lead to a final resolution of the issues presented in that
litigation, and, at the same time, the resolution of the various circuit court
approaches to SPD anomalies, the Court’s opinion and its remand to the lower court
should dampen those thoughts. The Court clarified that section 502(a)(1)(B) will not
serve as the basis for individual relief in response to employer (plan administrator)
violations of ERISA Sections 102(a) and 104(b). However, the Court has not
clarified the applicability of section 502(a)(1)(B) to section 204(h) violations, which
was not argued before the Supreme Court.
The Court has also resisted a one-size fits all mentality. Its focus on the
plaintiffs of this claim, and its acknowledgement of the “flexible approach” of

178

See id. at 754-71.

179

Id. at 751-52.

180

Id. at 764.

181

Id. at 782 (emphasis removed).

182

Id. (emphasis in original).
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equity,183 suggests that the Court will be open to a variety of lower court decisions
applicable only to the plaintiffs therein and ultimately not easily reviewable other
than for abuse of discretion because they will be uniquely fact-sensitive. Perhaps the
next set of appeals will be just that, whether the lower court abused its discretion in
fashioning appropriate equitable relief.
If we examine the Court’s clear statements, together with those issues that
the Court chose not to address and therefore left undisturbed, we should be able to
identify some conclusions:
1)
The plan administrator must act in a timely manner. Plans may be changed,
assuming they do not contain prohibitions against change and so long as the changes
do not affect vested rights, but timely notice of any changes must be given. Any
permissible changes must be prospective, not retroactive, and explained in advance
of the changes taking effect.
2)
The Plan is not anything other than the Plan. All materials and
communications about the Plan would fall under the category of SPDs. Plan
administrators should therefore restrict their summary plan descriptions and related
communications to as few documents as possible, perhaps only a single SPD, and
seek and receive pertinent compliance reviews confirming that any and all secondary
documents and communications do not add to, or alter, plan terms, unless the
additions and alterations are in fact desired. Careful analysis should be made
regarding whether any communication will result in a change of benefit and which
employees and other plan beneficiaries will be affected by the change.
3)
The employer should resist issuing communications to employees and plan
beneficiaries regarding the ERISA-governed Plan. All communications should
emanate from the plan administrator. Internally, the employer’s human resource
manager and the company’s general counsel should jointly review all
communications, proposals, and explanations. Employees and plan beneficiaries, as a
matter of course, should preserve all communications regarding their plans. Even
cover letters may be instrumental in establishing ERISA violations.
4)
The new “no reliance but actual harm required” standard resolves the dispute
among the circuits that has existed since the circuit courts began reviewing such

183

CIGNA, 131 S. Ct. at 1881 (citing BOGERT, supra note 164, § 861) (“In such instances equity
courts would ‘mold the relief to protect the rights of the beneficiary according to the situation
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issues. Employers and plan administrators with multi-jurisdictional plans now enjoy
a more uniform treatment of violations and remedies.
5)
Employees who do not suffer actual harm will have no reason to institute
legal action, and there will likely be fewer situations in which class actions would be
the appropriate form in which to bring suit. In those cases in which classes may be
recognized, they might in fact be smaller and more focused in the requested relief.
Equity may call for a variety of remedies within the same class.
The availability of equitable relief for individual claims based upon section
6)
502(a)(3) is clear, whether made through reformation, restitution, or surcharge, but
what will be “appropriate” in given circumstances remains uncertain. The availability
and application of equitable remedies will be determined by trust law principles, and
reference to the leading trust law authors will be expected.
7)
While much of the Court’s opinion consists of dicta, a reasonable expectation
is that such dicta will be followed in trial and lower appellate courts in the future.184
The Supreme Court itself seems to be doing equity. First, it balanced a strict
reading of the pertinent ERISA provisions with a generous degree of advisory
opinion. Second, it balanced the rights of employees to be given timely and accurate
information against the right of an employer not to be held to account for harmless
and unintended mistakes. Third, it balanced the right of employees and plan
beneficiaries to be secure in their vested benefits against the need and right of an
employer to amend a plan. Fourth, it balanced the right of an employer to make and
change ERISA-governed plans in accordance with its statutory right against the
rights of employees to make certain that the employer’s statutory rights are properly
exercised. Finally, it vested the lower courts with the authority to construct
appropriate equitable remedies for violations of ERISA-governed plans, but did not
dictate what those remedies must be. Courts now seem to have the flexibility and
discretion to fashion appropriate equitable relief, including money damages, under
section 502(a)(3). What remains to be seen is whether the Supreme Court, in so
doing, has set the stage for more litigation and the likelihood that additional
interpretation of section 502(a)(3) will be needed.
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